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EFFECTIVENESS AND INTERNAL SECURITY.  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA
Geoffrey ELLIS
Naval Offi cer, Naval Postgraduate School, USA
Nicaragua and El Salvador share many commonalities, including geographical 
vulnerabilities, widespread poverty, the experience of civil confl ict in the 1980s, 
and a transition to democracy in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, each state has 
drastically divergent levels of violence, as measured particularly by homicide rates, 
with Nicaragua among the lowest in Latin America and El Salvador among the 
highest in the world. This paper assesses the historical and institutional variables 
that account for this divergence and evaluates each state’s security structures using 
a civil-military relations analysis. In particular, the author uses Bruneau and Matei’s 
criterion of effectiveness. The fi ndings demonstrate that Nicaragua’s security forces 
consolidated during the 1980s in a manner more capable of sustaining the democratic 
transition and confronting new security threats like gangs and organized crime.
Key words:  civil-military relations, Nicaragua, El Salvador, effectiveness, 
violence, Central America. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This year, El Salvador is projected 
to have the highest homicide rate in the
world. At 92 per 100,000 inhabitants for
2015, its homicide rate has more than 
doubled since the breakdown of the 
gang truce in 2012 [1]. Nicaragua, 
by contrast, has experienced 
homicide rates steadily near or 
below 10 per 100,000 for over a 
decade, with 2014 one of the lowest 
yet at 8.7 per 100,000 inhabitants [2].
In this paper, I will examine this 
divergence in internal security 
outcomes through a civil-military 
relations analysis of the security 
forces of each state [3]. Contrasting 
El Salvador and Nicaragua offers 
useful insights due to the relevant 
similarities and differences. Both 
countries underwent a civil war in the 
1980s. Both struggle with legacies of 
authoritarianism, and each is situated 
geographically within a major 
transshipment zone for narcotics from 
South America to the United States. 
The two states also differ in key ways, 
including varying degrees of foreign 
military assistance, different types of 
democratic transitions, and distinct 
methods of security sector formation 
during the civil war periods.
1.1 Objectives and Methodology
My aim is to explore the 
divergence in violence levels using 
a civil-military relations analysis of 
effectiveness of the security forces as 
my point of departure. Many Latin 
American civil-military relations 
specialists focus on democratic 
civilian control of the military–
a natural topic for a region that has, 
by and large, only democratized 
within the last several decades. 
Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier 
and the State paved the way for 
this type of analysis, infl uencing 
leading civil-military relations 
scholars like Peter Feaver and John 
Allen Williams [4]. With respect 
to Latin America, academics have 
written about the infl uence of military 
prerogatives and reserve domains on 
democratic civilian control. Alfred 
Stepan pioneered this kind of analysis 
with his seminal analysis of military 
prerogatives in South America. 
In Rethinking Military Politics: 
Brazil and the Southern Cone, 
Stepan outlined eleven indicators 
to assess the prerogatives of the 
military of Brazil, which other 
scholars have applied to various 
Latin American states [5].
Others, like Narcis Serra have 
written about civil-military relations 
in democratic transitions, drawing 
from his transformational tenure 
as Spain’s fi rst defense minister 
after Franco. Serra also stresses the 
centrality of democratic civilian 
control and subordination of the 
military. In his prologue to Debating 
Civil-Military Relations in Latin 
America (2014), Serra argues for 
the ongoing centrality of democratic 
civilian control due to “the need to fi nd 
policies that place them [the military] 
in a position subordinate to the new 
democratic authorities” [6]. Serra 
alludes to the 2009 coup in Honduras 
as evidence for the continued 
centrality of democratic civilian 
control [7]. David R. Mares explores 
the various public opinion surveys 
conducted by Latinobarómetro and 
the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP) to examine attitudes 
toward the military and democratic 
civilian governance [8]. He fi nds that 
most countries remain vulnerable to 
coups due to “distrust of government 
and a polarization of politics” 
combined with a high regard for the 
military [9].
For my paper, I move beyond this 
focus on democratic civilian control 
to use an analytical framework that 
fi rst arose through a debate between 
David Pion-Berlin and Thomas 
Bruneau in 2005-2006. Pion-
Berlin contends that democratic 
civilian control in Latin America is 
better than most give credit, as he 
differentiates between the “balance 
of competence”, which “tilts still 
heavily in favor of the military”, 
and the “balance of power”, which 
he argues “has moved in favor of 
civilians” [10]. Thomas Bruneau 
responded to Pion-Berlin’s analysis 
of Latin America by contending that 
civilians needed to develop suffi cient 
knowledge about defense and security 
issues [11]. Bruneau proposed 
analyzing civil-military relations 
with a new analytical framework that 
moves beyond the traditional focus on 
democratic civilian control. Bruneau 
and his colleague Matei proposed 
a trinitarian analytical framework 
analyzing civil-military relations 
through democratic civilian control, 
effectiveness, and effi ciency [12]. 
Of the three, I focus on the criterion 
of effectiveness and apply it to the 
security forces of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, respectively.
Matei’s articulation of the 
trinitarian framework contains 
several points relevant to my 
analysis. First, Matei argues that, 
faced with “network-centricity and 
network-like traits of new security 
threats”, security roles and missions 
have expanded beyond a traditional 
military focus to include police and 
intelligence agencies [13]. I use this 
perspective in analyzing the security 
sectors of the two states. Second, 
Matei argues that emphasis on control 
is not enough; instead, scholars must 
assess “the perspective of making 
effective security decisions and 
policies” [14]. Effectiveness, in the 
case of El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
is the central focus of my analysis 
of security forces’ approaches to 
violence. Finally, Matei proposes 
three indicators with which to evaluate 
effectiveness of a security force in 
fulfi lling its assigned missions:  plans, 
structures, and resources [15]. I will 
use these indicators to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the internal security 
forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
I argue that Nicaragua’s security 
forces had plans, structures, and 
resources better capable of adapting 
to the new threats posed by gang 
violence that arose during the early 
1990s democratization period. These 
included community-based security 
organizations, a highly trained 
civilian police force, adequate 
funding, and sociologically sound 
rehabilitative plans to confront 
criminality and gangs. Conversely, 
El Salvador’s security forces 
underwent a profound disruption and 
reorganization during the democratic 
transition that left it vulnerable and 
less capable of adapting to new 
security challenges. First, I will 
examine the historical factors that 
have infl uenced the effectiveness 
of the security forces. Then, using 
Matei’s indicators of effectiveness, 
I evaluate and contrast Nicaragua 





Notwithstanding the emphasis 
on reforming the military and police, 
the legacy of the civil war period 
had implanted deep-rooted habits of 
impunity and military domination of 
internal security.  As the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies’ 
(CSIS) report on police reform in 
Latin America asserts, “Fighting 
communism during the Cold War led 
to aiding Latin American defense 
establishments that controlled the 
police” [16]. During the civil war, 
El Salvador’s police functioned, as 
CSIS states, “as a fourth branch 
of the military” [17]. No Central 
American state received more U.S. 
foreign military assistance than El 
Salvador; between 1981 and 1992, the 
U.S. delivered a total of $273 million 
for the military and $860 million 
in general economic aid [18]. High 
military prerogatives in El Salvador 
were established during the 1980s 
war and have been slow to diminish. 
The United States unwittingly helped 
foment serious impunity problems in 
the security forces in El Salvador. 
As Jack Spence points out, “They 
[El Salvador’s military] knew the 
U.S. needed them” and used this 
dependence to ensure their “impunity 
from the law” [19]. According to the 
Truth Commission, “any organization 
in a position to promote opposing 
ideas that questioned offi cial policy 
was automatically labeled as working 
for the guerillas” [20].
El Salvador’s security forces 
underwent a profound transition after 
the 1992 UN-sponsored Chapultepec 
Peace Accords. The accords were the 
result of two years of negotiations 
between the government and the 
FMLN insurgents [21]. Reforms were 
ambitious in scope with a number of 
specifi c goals, including reforming 
military doctrine, altering military 
education, purifying security forces 
of human rights abusers, reducing 
prerogatives, eliminating paramilitary 
actors (like the infamous death 
squads), and creating a civilian-led, 
professionalized national police [22]. 
The Chapultepec Peace Accords 
operations and augment police 
efforts to confront growing gang 
violence using Mano Dura strategies. 
As Barany observes, other than the 
military, “the state simply has no one 
else to turn to” [28]. In contrast, as I 
will show next, the Sandinistas had, 
in 1979, already replaced a repressive 
security state with a new structure 
of state security. The Nicaraguan 
security forces were more capable of 
enduring the transition to democracy, 
as their transition did not entail such 
a severe restructuring. 
2.2. Nicaragua
After the 1979 Sandinista 
revolution, the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) subordinated 
the military and police under its 
control:  “From 1979 until 1990, it 
was impossible to separate the state, 
the army, and the party” [29]. As 
Margarita Villareal succinctly states, 
the security forces were “part of the 
political and ideological apparatus 
that supported the revolution” [30]. 
The Sandinistas consolidated control 
over of the new security sector, 
which consisted of the Sandinista 
Peoples Army (EPS), a newly created 
Civilian National Police (PNC), and 
Comités de la Defensa Sandinista 
(CDS). Although controlled by a 
one-party state during the 1980s, the 
security sector formed and retained its 
fundamental characteristics through 
the transition to democracy. 
A declassifi ed U.S. Army 
intelligence report from 1983 offers 
insights into how the Sandinistas 
established and shaped their newly 
formed armed forces and police. 
According to the report, the Sandinistas 
invited the Panamanian National 
Guard in to train the newly created 
national police force [31]. Several 
hundred Nicaraguan police offi cers 
also attended police academies in 
Panama during the years after the 
called for the establishment of the 
Civilian National Police (PNC) with 
a central focus on protecting human 
rights—an effort to prevent the 
recurrence of the widespread torture 
and killings of state security forces 
and death squads during the civil 
war [23]. Like many militaries after 
civil wars, El Salvador’s military 
reorganized after the peace accords 
to include equal representation of 
former guerilla insurgents. 
The transition for the security 
sector has not yet resulted in an 
effective and capable security force. 
The legacy of state-directed violence 
and ongoing impunity has left a 
security sector with high prerogatives 
and weakened state institutions, 
as Barany details [24]. These high 
prerogatives manifested early on during 
the transition in the blanket impunity 
granted the military in 1993 after 
the United Nations-sponsored Truth 
Commission for El Salvador found over 
85 percent of serious acts of violence 
committed by agents of the state [25]. 
Despite only being authorized for 
emergencies, El Salvador’s military has 
continued to act as a primary agent in the 
struggle against the gang problem. The 
PNC suffers from endemic corruption, 
ineffi ciency, resource shortfalls, poor 
administration, and lack of uniformity 
in collection of evidence [26].
The negotiated settlement 
between the FMLN and the 
government resulted in a purifi ed 
but severely weakened security 
sector. By agreement, the PNC was 
comprised of mostly civilians with 
no prior background in policing, with 
the exception of roughly 20 percent 
of the top positions allotted to both 
the security forces of the former 
regime and the FMLN [27]. Faced 
with the disruptions caused by such a 
massive institutional reorganization, 
El Salvador has continued to rely 
on its military to conduct security 
revolution [32]. The Army intelligence 
report details how the Nicaraguans 
soon created a sophisticated police 
academy that “includes an 8-month 
course emphasizing physical fi tness, 
criminology, sociology, law, and 
political indoctrination” with 
“advanced training” for “specialized 
administrative positions such as 
prosecutors or police chiefs” [33].
The report makes note, in 
particular, of a key element of 
Nicaragua’s emerging security 
apparatus:  Comités de la Defensa 
Sandinista (CDS), or Sandinista 
Defense Committees. The CDS 
formed an important and unique 
cornerstone of the state security 
apparatus. The effectiveness of 
the unit-level model for citizen 
security derived from the greater 
information-gathering capabilities 
inherent to the system. Membership 
in the CDS was diffuse and 
widespread. By 1986, membership 
in the CDS included 500,000 out of 
a total population of 3.5 million [34]. 
Modeled after the Cuban Defense 
Committees, the system of CDS 
combined citizen security with 
providing for social welfare, enabling 
political participation, and delivering 
public goods [35].
After the revolution of 1979, 
the Nicaraguans established a 
security structure that was capable of 
withstanding a democratic transition 
without requiring massive reform, as 
in the case of El Salvador. One major 
source of grievances leading to the 
Sandinista revolution had been the 
repressive character of the dictator 
Somoza’s security apparatus, in 
particular the National Guard. As 
the current head of the PNC, Aminta 
Granera, a former nun and FSLN 
revolutionary, stated regarding the 
establishment of the national police 
in 1979, “We didn’t know how to be 
police. We only knew we didn’t want 
to be like the Somozan Guard” [36]. 
The Sandinistas consciously formed 
the internal security institutions to 




In this section, I use Matei’s 
indicators of plans, structures, and 
resources to assess the effectiveness 
of El Salvador and Nicaragua’s 
respective security forces. Matei 
defi nes plans as any formulated 
policies directing the security forces 
to fulfi ll one of their assigned roles and 
missions, which for my paper center 
on internal security and strategies to 
counter rising levels of gang-related 
violence [37].  Structures, according 
to Matei, include the processes 
“to both formulate the plans and 
implement them”, usually in the 
form of effective state agencies that 
coordinate policies well throughout 
the government [38]. Finally, Matei 
defi nes resources as “political 
capital, money, and personnel” 
that allow forces to “implement the 
assigned roles and missions” [39]. 
3.1. El Salvador
3.1.1. Plans:  LOW
The reactive nature of El 
Salvador’s policies toward gang 
violence has demonstrated the lack 
of an enlightened and sophisticated 
internal security plan. McCulloch 
and Pickering aptly defi ne crime 
prevention as “non-punitive measures 
that reduce opportunities to commit 
crime or address the broader context 
in which people commit crime through 
a range of social and environmental 
strategies” [40]. A U.S. Government 
Accountability Offi ce (GAO) report 
from 1992 pointed out how “the 
government [of El Salvador] had 
not yet developed plans outlining the 
structure, operations, or resource 
needs of the police force” [41]. 
As a result, the Director-General 
of the police force was prohibited, 
per negotiation with the FMLN, 
from having any affi liation with the 
previous police forces [42]. The fi rst 
director, a businessman, had no prior 
police experience “to draw on as he 
prepares the plan” [43]. Yet effective 
anti-gang policies often require 
sophisticated plans, as Preciado 
argues [44]. El Salvador has instead 
relied on Mano Dura strategies that 
incriminate and incarcerate gang 
members, using its military to make 
up for the defi ciencies in the police. 
3.1.2.  Structures:  LOW
Poor administration and lack of 
uniformity in collection of evidence 
reveal structural and institutional 
defi ciencies in the national police [45]. 
El Salvador’s Strategic Institutional 
Plan 2009-2014 indicates several 
weaknesses in the police force 
including “lack of incentives”, “little 
development of police investigation 
and intelligence”, “lack of 
standardization in the databases”, 
“fragmented organization”, and 
“lack of training” among other 
key defi ciencies [46]. El Salvador’s 
Mano Dura strategy has tried to fi ll 
the gap with the military. In 2015, 
the president ordered up to 7,000 of 
the military’s total force of 25,000 
to patrol the streets, and offi cers 
operate with wide latitude since the 
government proclaimed offi cers will 
not be charged for killings professed 
to be in self-defense [47].
3.1.3. Resources:  LOW-MEDIUM
The national police in El Salvador 
suffer from chronic resource shortfalls 
[48]. The lack of resources allocated to 
the police is apparent by the fact that 
private security guards outnumber 
police 28,600 to 22,000 [49]. One 
newspaper correspondent in San 
Salvador describes the chaotic 
security situation as of August 2015:
“Schools are protected by barbed 
wire and often patrolled by soldiers; 
private security guards carrying 
shotguns man the entrance to major 
businesses and police, armed with 
rifl es, conduct random checks on the 
highways….it is not uncommon to see 
soldiers in balaclavas riding on the 
back of fl at-bed trucks mounted with 
heavy machine guns. Few people pay 
them a second glance.”[50]
The PNC itself reports that its 
“limited operational budget” hinders 
effectiveness [51]. The government in 
2005 reported 14,000 gang members 
incarcerated but only 45 rehabilitated 
through an “Open Hand” initiative, 
due in part to lack of funding and 
resources [52].
3.2.  Nicaragua
3.2.1.  Plans:  HIGH
The chief of the National Police in 
2014, Aminta Granera, attributed the 
anti-gang and anti-crime successes to 
a combination of measures that are 
“preventivo, comunitario y proactivo” 
(preventative, community-based, and 
proactive) [53]. The Nicaraguan police 
created the Offi ce of Juvenile Issues as 
the central node for the development 
for its preventative model of gang 
violence prevention [54]. José Luis 
Rocha commends the “exceptional 
character of the Nicaraguan police”, 
especially their “conciliatory 
discourse and propaganda” and 
their attempt to “overcome repressive 
penal models”, instead treating 
gang members as objects of social 
rehabilitation [55]. Rocha contends 
that the National Police approached 
the issue of gang violence in a 
distinctively sophisticated and 
rehabilitative manner:
“The Sandinista elite’s ability to 
use sociological terms and concepts 
and their notoriously superior 
discursive capacity in relation to 
their Central American colleagues 
enabled the appearance of innovative 
proposals and an assessment of citizen 
security that deepened the analysis 




As The Economist dryly observed, 
“Nicaragua’s police force is in 
danger of giving socialism a good 
name” [57]. As Rocha argues, the 
police since the democratic transition 
are comprised of two distinct factions 
that complement one another:  the 
traditional elite and the FSLN [58]. 
Rocha contends that the FSLN faction 
has encouraged the rehabilitative 
policies toward gangs and resisted 
pressure from traditional elites who 
sought to implement policies similar 
to mano dura [59]. Nicaragua’s 
police operate independently from 
the military, which conduct limited 
internal security missions. Instead, 
the military’s role in internal security 
is limited to about 2,000 troops who 
provide security for Nicaragua’s 
coffee production [60]. In contrast to 
El Salvador, Nicaragua has not used 
the military for anti-gang and anti-
drug policy responses. Moreover, 
Nicaragua has created thousands of 
Comités de Prevención Social del 
Delito, or Committees for the Social 
Prevention of Crime, comprised 
of 20,000 volunteers [61]. As 
Cruz points out, the state excels 
at “involving citizens in crime 
prevention committees—not in mere 
neighborhood watch groups—in 
the development of local safety 
strategies” [62].
3.2.3.  Resources:  HIGH
Nicaragua’s security budget 
has remained steady at an average 
of 1.2% of GDP between the years 
2005 and 2013 [63]. The share of the 
budget allotted to the PNC has risen 
by 64% over the same eight years, a 
larger increase than any other security 
organization [64]. Nicaragua has also 
devoted resources to many programs 
to prevent gang violence, including 
sports tournaments, cooperation 
with social services volunteers, 
and scholarships for youth [65]. 
The national police have a rigorous 
education program mandating four-
year degrees at the National Police 
Academy for aspiring commissioned 
offi cers [66]. The government funds 
training and education courses for 
ongoing instruction in the science of 
community policing [67].
4.  CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
El Salvador and Nicaragua have 
experienced dramatically different 
levels of citizen security in the years 
since democratization in the early 
1990s. In this paper, I have examined 
this divergence using a civil-military 
relations framework to evaluate the 
security forces of each state. First, 
I outlined the historical factors that 
infl uenced and shaped each state’s 
security sectors. I argued that the 
divergence in effectiveness arose 
from the different development 
paths taken during the 1980s civil 
war periods. Dominated by an 
authoritarian military using any 
means necessary to fi ght the FMLN 
insurgency, El Salvador’s security 
forces underwent a profound period 
of reform and purifi cation brought 
about by the 1992 Chapultepec Peace 
Accords. Nicaragua’s security forces, 
on the other hand, formed effective 
institutions after the break with 
Somoza’s dynasty that maintained 
their basic structures through the 
transition to democracy. I then 
used the criterion of effectiveness 
developed by Bruneau and Matei, 
along with Matei’s three indicators 
of effectiveness, to evaluate each 
state. Table 1 outlines the results of 
my analysis. 
Table 1. Assessment of Internal Security 









    
My analysis points to specifi c areas 
in which El Salvador’s security forces 
must improve to achieve increased 
effectiveness. First, El Salvador’s 
security forces should develop coherent 
anti-gang strategies that emphasize the 
role of rehabilitation and move away 
from Mano Dura strategies. Recent 
developments in El Salvador suggest 
government offi cials are beginning to 
understand this. On October 26, 2015, 
El Salvador’s Security and Justice 
Minister formally presented Congress 
with a proposed law that would grant 
legal immunity to gang members who 
have not committed serious crimes, 
affording them the opportunity to 
enter into a government-sponsored 
rehabilitation program [68]. The 
proposed law, formally called the “Gang 
Reinsertion Law”, faces challenges due 
to inadequate funding, a problem that 
Lohmuller argues caused the gang truce 
to fi zzle in 2012 [69]. Nevertheless, 
the proposal marks a step in the right 
direction. Second, the use of the military 
in El Salvador should come as a last 
resort, since internal security against 
gangs requires more sophisticated 
policing and community-prevention 
strategies. The lasting solution is to 
fi x the structure of internal security; 
specifi cally, the state must provide 
the police force with better quality 
education, career incentives, better pay, 
and professional development. Finally, 
El Salvador needs to increase funding 
for the police. To this end, a recent sign 
of hope emerged when El Salvador’s 
congress enacted a new tax on wealthy 
individuals and large companies to raise 
revenues for the PNC [70].
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